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INTRODUCTION

Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the federal government has
played a significant role in reducing invidious discrimination against
individuals on the basis of race, religion, color and national origin. Title 112 of that Act prohibits discrimination or segregation in places of
public accommodation if the operations of such establishments affect
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Sean B. Druyon, University of Utah, B.S., 1998; University of Nebraska, J.D.
2001 (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive Editor, 2001). I would like to give special thanks to my wife and children for all the love and support they have given
me.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
2. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
*
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commerce 3 or if the discrimination or segregation therein is supported
by state action.4 State antidiscrimination and public accommodation
statutes generally provide greater protection than Title 11.5 Although
state public accommodation laws initially mirrored the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, they have progressively increased in scope. 6 State public
accommodation laws now prohibit discrimination on the basis of appearance, sexual orientation, physical handicap, past criminal con7
duct, marital status and much more.
In the wake of these broadening state laws against discrimination
lie many private organizations treading to stay afloat in what has become a tumultuous sea of clashing constitutional rights. These private
organizations justify their discriminatory membership policies on the
grounds they engage in expressive association protected by the First
Amendment, 8 while individuals denied membership to these organizations claim equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment and under state public accommodation laws. Courts at all levels
have struggled to establish when a group is constitutionally permitted
to discriminate in contravention of state public accommodation laws. 9
Part of this struggle is due to the fact that this conflict is a relatively
new one. Indeed, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue on only
a few occasions. In each of these cases it applied an ad hoc balancing
test, weighing the state's interest in eradicating discrimination on one
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See generally Note, Discriminationin Access to Public Places: A Survey of State
and FederalPublic-AccommodationsLaws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215,
238-241 (1978)(discussing how state laws have historically provided the most effective means of preventing discrimination).
6. Many state antidiscrimination statutes define "place of public accommodation"
quite broadly, as covering any "business or entertainment... facility of any kind
whose... services... are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to
the general public." HAW. REv. STAT. § 489-2 (1993); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§24-34-601(1)(1999)("any place offering services . . . to the public"); IND. CODE
ANN. §22-9-1-3(m)(1997)("establishment that caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public"). Many statutes give a list of examples though stressing that these are only examples and not limitations - which often
include "educational institution[s]," "theatre[s]," and "librar[ies]." CoLo. REV.
STAT. §24-34-601(1)(1999); see Pamela Griffin, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: FirstAmendment Limitations upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047,
1050-51 (1985).
7. The District of Columbia, for instance, also bars discrimination based on "age,
marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation.., family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of
residence or business." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 901, 906
(1985); Lois M. McKenna, Note, Freedom of Association or Gender Discrimination? New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
1061, 1066 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 8, at 901.
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side, with the private organization's interest in communicating its
message on the other. None of these decisions, however, clearly define
the criteria for when a private organization can, if ever, prevail over a
state's law against discrimination. Essentially, the ad hoc balancing
adopted by the Supreme Court has a subjective element that invites
inconsistent results.
Boy Scouts of America v. DaleiO presents the issue of whether a
private organization is entitled to the right of freedom of expressive
association under the First Amendment, thereby exempting it from a
state's public accommodation law, when it had a general mission
statement to "instill values in young people"11 and had limited evidence that its exclusionary policy against homosexuality was on the
basis that homosexuality was immoral, yet denied a leadership position to a homosexual on the grounds a homosexual's mere presence as
a leader would send a message contrary to the Boy Scouts' asserted
policy that homosexuality is immoral. Dale clearly illustrates that the
proper standard for determining whether a private organization can
discriminate in contravention of a state's public accommodation law is
yet unresolved.
This Note, in Part II, provides a background of Supreme Court
cases dealing specifically with the conflict between freedom of expressive association and state public accommodation laws. Part III reviews the procedural posture of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
identifying the central issues and decisions of the courts below. Part
IV analyzes the Supreme Court majority's standard and contrasts it
with the dissent's heightened standard, concluding that both sides deviate from precedent in reaching their respective conclusions. While
the majority's standard provides too much protection to groups at the
expense of equality, the dissent's standard provides far too little protection to groups who engage in purely expressive association. Finally, this Note proposes a standard that reconciles these competing
standards.
II. BACKGROUND OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
Roberts v. United States Jaycees
The first Supreme Court case addressing whether a private organization had a right to expressive association as a defense to a state's
12
public accommodation law was Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
The United States Jaycees was a non-profit national membership corporation whose objective was, according to its bylaws, "to pursue such
educational and charitable purposes as would promote and foster the
10. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
11. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1999).
12. 468 U.S. 609 (1983).
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growth and development of young men's civic organizations."' 3 The
Jaycees advocated a number of political and public causes,1 4 and provided management and leadership training to its members.' 5 According to the Jaycees' membership policy, only young men between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five years could obtain full membership
status, while any other person could achieve an associate member status.16 Full membership status entitled a member to participate in
7
voting, hold office, and participate in leadership training programs.'
Associate members could attend all other meetings, voice concerns,
and express their own opinions.' 8
One of the central issues before the Court was whether Minnesota
could apply its public accommodation law to the Jaycees and compel it
to admit women to full member status.' 9 The Minnesota public accommodation law prohibited any organization from denying women,
among other groups, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place
of public accommodation.20
In response to the Jaycees' claim that it was entitled to discriminate against women in its membership selection, the Court delineated
2
two distinct association rights under the First Amendment: intimate '
and expressive. With respect to the Jaycees' claim to expressive association, the Court preliminarily analyzed the rationale behind preserving this right. It noted that an individual's right to speak,
worship, and petition the government for the redress of grievances
could not be protected from state interference unless a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort towards those ends was not also
guaranteed. 2 2 The Court added, "we have long understood as implicit
in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends."2 3 The Court also noted:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 612.
See id. at 616-17.
See id. at 613-14.
See id. at 613.
See id.
See id. at 621.
See id. at 612.
See Mnf'N. STAT. §363.03 Subd. 3 (1991).
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. This Note will limit its analysis to the right to
expressive association.
22. See id. at 622.
23. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456, U.S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)).
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members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the
original members to express only those views that brought them together.
Freedom 24
of association, therefore, plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.

The Court then established the standard for determining when a
group was entitled to expressive association as a defense to a state's
public accommodation law. First, the group had to be engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. 25 It then had to show how
the forced inclusion of the unwanted member would significantly impede its ability to disseminate its message. But the Court was quick
to note that this right to expressive association was not absolute.
Rather, "[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 2 6 Thus, the Court applied a balancing test, weighing the state's interest on one side and the group's
interest in communicating its message on the other.
Applying this standard, the Court held that since the Jaycees advocated a number of political and public causes, as well as provided
management and leadership training to its members, it was engaged
in expressive activity. 27 The Court then held that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women,
28
since women had a history of being economically disadvantaged.
The Court ultimately found that the Jaycees failed to show how the
integration of women, as full members, would significantly impede its
ability to pursue "educational and charitable purposes as will promote
and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the United States." 29 It held that since the Jaycees already
had women participants, changing the status of a woman from associate to full voting-member status would, at most, incidentally affect its
expression.30 Rejecting the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rationale
that women could affect the expression of the Jaycees as speculative,
the Court held that there was no evidence to support the proposition
that if enough women became voting members they would in fact vote
on issues disadvantageous toward young men. 31 Thus, since the
Jaycees failed to meet its burden, the Roberts balancing test was
tipped in favor of Minnesota's interest in eradicating discrimination
against women.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
See id. at 622.
Id.
See id. at 626-27.
See id. at 623, 626.
Id. at 612 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 2).
See id. at 627.
See id.
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Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte
In Board ofDirectors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte,3 2 the Court was faced with the precise issue it faced in Roberts:
whether a state's public accommodation law prohibiting all-male clubs
from discriminating against women unconstitutionally infringed on
the Rotary Club's right to freedom of association. 33 Addressing Rotary Club's expressive association claim, the Court echoed Roberts and
found that the Rotary Club was indeed an expressive association since
it, as the Jaycees, advocated many political and public causes. 34 The
Court then applied the Roberts balancing test; it found that California
had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women;3 5 it then found that the Rotary Club failed to prove how the
36
forced inclusion of a woman would significantly impede its message.
The Court concluded that since Rotary Club failed to meet its burden,
the balancing test tipped in favor of California's interest in eradicating discrimination against women. With respect to the expressive association standard, Rotary Club merely reiterated the ad hoc
balancing test established in Roberts.
New York State Club Association v. New York City
Just one year after deciding Rotary Club, the Supreme Court decided a third case dealing with the conflict between a group's claim to
expressive association and a state's antidiscrimination law. In New
York State Club Association v. City of New York, 37 the New York State
Club Association challenged the constitutionality of New York City's
39
AlHuman Rights Law ("HRL")38 on the basis it was overly broad.
though this law initially exempted "any institution, club or place of
accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private,"40 a 1984 amendment provided that any institution, club or
place of accommodation, other than a benevolent order or a religious
corporation, shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it
has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service
and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, etc., directly or indi32. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).

33. See id. at 539.
34. See id. at 548.
35. See id. at 549.
36. See id. at 549 n.8.
37. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
38. Also known as "Local Law No. 97 of 1965." See New York State Club Ass'n, 487
U.S. at 4 n.1.
39. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 11.
40. Id. at 5 (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., Anvxm. CODE § 8-102(9)(1986)).
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rectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or
4
business. 1
While the Court focused its analysis on the facial challenge to the
HRL, it also addressed and abruptly rejected the State Club Association's expressive association argument. It held that most large clubs
subject to the HRL will not be able to show that they were "organized
for specific expressive purposes and will not be able to advocate ...
[their] desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if [they] cannot confine
[their] membership[s] to those who share the same sex, for example,
or the same religion."4 2 Since the Club facially challenged the HRL,
the Court refused to provide constitutional protection to the Club, "let
alone a substantial number of them,"4 3 unless it could identify other
organizations that may be adversely affected by New York's law. Although the Club was unsuccessful in showing how other organizations
may have been affected by New York's HRL, the Court suggested that
it might allow a more expansive reading of associational freedoms if a
club could make a fact-based claim indicating how the unwanted
44
member would significantly impede its message.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
45
Boston
In 1992, a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish
immigrants formed the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston ("GLIB") for the express purpose of marching in the
South Boston St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade.4 6 In 1993,
after the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (Council) denied
GLIB's application to march in the parade, GLIB brought suit claiming that the Council's discriminatory acts violated state and federal
constitutions as well as a Massachusetts's public accommodation statute.4 7 The Council denied admission to GLIB "as its own parade unit
carrying its own banner."48 While the parade took place in public, the
Court held that the Council's selection process for marching units was
not a public accommodation. 49 Rather, the Court held that since pa41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9)(1986)).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 20-23.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
See id. at 561.
Massachusetts' public accommodations law prohibited "any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of... sexual orientation ... relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement." See id. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 272 §98 (1992)).
48. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
49. See id. at 573.
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rades are inherently expressive in nature,SO and since GLIB would be
actively sending a pro-gay message, the Council's rejection of GLIB
was an exercise of free speech.51 Since freedom of speech also entails
the freedom not to speak, the Court unanimously held that by forcing
the Council to accept GLIB would infringe upon its right to define its
52
voice.
In addressing the Council's purported right to freedom of expressive association, the Court reiterated the holding in New York State
Club Association, stating that "[i]f [it] were to analyze this case
strictly along [freedom of expressive association] lines, GLIB would
lose." 53 It added, "GLIB could nonetheless be refused admission as an
expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at
odds with a position taken by the club's existing members." 54 Since
GLIB's presence would significantly impede the Council's speech, the
Council was justified in denying GLIB its request to march in the
parade.
Although Hurley focused on the Council's right to freedom of
speech, its brief analysis on expressive association implicitly added an
important component to the Roberts test. Hurley suggested that not
only is an expressive association entitled to the right to communicate
the message of its choice, it may also be entitled to define its voice
through the selection of its members. 55 The Court held that since parades are inherently expressive activities,56 and since viewers of private parades are likely to believe that the organizers of a parade select
marchers that communicate messages it approves, 5 7 then GLIB's
mere presence would be sending a message that the Council approves
the gay, lesbian, and bisexual movement.5 8 Although the Council had
no expressive purpose specifically against the homosexual movement,
the Court, with little analysis, nonetheless held that the Council's discriminatory action was protected under the right of expressive associ50. The Court stated, "'symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas.'" See id. at 569 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632 (1943)). The Court added that "'[s]ince all speech inherently involves
choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one important manifestation of
the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide
'what not to say.'" Id. at 573 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)(plurality opinion)).
51. See id.at 573.
52. "The selection of contingents to make a parade is entitled to [First Amendment]
protection." Id. at 570.
53. Id. at 580.
54. Id. at 580-81.
55. See id. at 569-70.
56. See id.573.
57. See id. at 574-75.
58. See id.
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ation. 59 Curiously, the Court did not require the Council to show how
the forced inclusion of GLIB would significantly affect its ability to
disseminate its message, as required by Roberts.60 Rather, the Council merely had to show that it disagreed with GLIB's message. Although Hurley suggests that certain organizations are entitled to
discriminate under the right to expressive association or freedom of
speech, it failed to identify the triggering factors to either standard.
III.

BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA v. DALE: FACTUAL
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

James Dale became involved with the Boy Scouts of America by
joining the Cub Scouts in 1978 at the age of eight. 61 After three years,
Dale became a Boy Scout.6 2 In 1988, Dale achieved the rank of Eagle
63
Scout, one of Scouting's highest honors.
In 1989, Dale applied for adult membership as a leader in the Boy
Scouts. The Boy Scouts approved his application, which was for the
position of assistant scoutmaster of Troop 73. That same year, Dale
left home to attend Rutgers University.6 4 After arriving, Dale publicly acknowledged that he was gay. Soon Dale became the co-president of the Rutgers University's Lesbian/Gay Alliance. The next year
Dale attended a seminar addressing the psychological and health
needs of lesbian and gay teenagers. After that seminar, a newspaper
interviewed Dale about his advocacy of homosexual teenagers' need
for gay role models.65 In July 1990, the newspaper published that interview, along with Dale's photograph. The caption above the photograph identified Dale as the co-president of the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance. 6 6 That same month, the Monmouth Council Executive
James Kay sent Dale a letter informing him that his membership had
been revoked. When Dale wrote to obtain the reason for the Council's
decision, Kay responded by stating that the Boy Scouts "specifically
forbid membership to homosexuals." 6 7
In 1992, Dale filed a complaint with the New Jersey Superior
Court against the Boy Scouts for violating New Jersey's public accommodation statute by revoking Dale's membership solely on his sexual
orientation. Among other things, New Jersey's public accommodation
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 580.
See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449-50 (2000).
See id. at 2449-50.
See id. at 2450.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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statute prohibits discrimination 6on
the basis of sexual orientation in
places of public accommodation. 8
The New Jersey Superior Court's Chancery Division granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts, and held that "New Jersey's
public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts
was not a place of public accommodation, and that, alternatively, the
Boy Scouts is a distinctly private group exempted from coverage under
New Jersey's law."69 The court also held that the Boy Scouts' position
with respect to active homosexuality was clear and held that the First
Amendment freedom of expressive association bared the government
from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader.70 On
appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. It held that "New Jersey's
public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts and that the Boy
Scouts violated it."71 The Appellate Division rejected the Boy Scouts'
federal constitutional claims.72
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division and held that
the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation subject to the public accommodations law, that the organization was not exempt from the law under
any of its express exceptions, and that the Boy Scouts violated 7the
law by
3
revoking Dale's membership based on his avowed homosexuality.

The court then addressed whether New Jersey's public accommodation law unconstitutionally infringed on First Amendment rights "to
enter into and maintain... intimate or private relationships ... [and]

to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech."74
The court rejected the Boy Scouts' intimate association claim on
the grounds the Boy Scouts was a large, nonselective group that was
inclusive rather than exclusive, and also had a practice of inviting or
allowing nonmembers to attend its meetings. 75 The court also rejected the Boy Scouts' claim to expressive association. The court
"agree[d] that Boy Scouts expresses a belief in moral values and uses
its activities to encourage the moral development of its members;"76
however, it "concluded that it was 'not persuaded ... that a shared
goal of Boy Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view
that homosexuality is immoral.'" 7 7 As a result, "the court held 'that
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 2450.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Dale's membership does not violate the Boy Scouts' right of expressive
association because his inclusion would not 'affect in any significant
way [the Boy Scouts'] existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.'"78 It also held that "New Jersey has a compelling interest in eliminating' the destructive consequences of discrimination
from our society, and that its public accommodation law abridges no
more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose." 79
Finally, the court addressed the Boy Scouts' reliance on Hurley in
support of its alleged right to exclude Dale under the First Amendment.8 0 The court determined that Hurley did not require deciding
the case in favor of the Boy Scouts because "the reinstatement of Dale
does not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message."8
Applying Hurley, the Court found that the forced inclusion of Dale,
as a homosexual, would significantly impede the Boy Scouts' ability to
teach values.8 2 It further reasoned that if the Boy Scouts opposed homosexuality as a legitimate form of behavior, and if scoutmasters
teach by example, it necessarily follows that a homosexual scoutmaster would send contradictory messages to scouts. 8 3 Although the
Court did cursorily address the overbreadth of New Jersey's public accommodation law,8 4 it was silent with respect to whether New Jersey
had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against
homosexuals.
The dissent conceded that the Boy Scouts was an organization engaged in expressive activity, but sharply disagreed with the majority's
use of Hurley as the proper standard for expressive associational
claims.8 5 Rather, the dissent opined that the Roberts balancing test
should apply, weighing the Boy Scouts' interest in preserving its ability to disseminate its message against New Jersey's interest in eradicating discrimination. Addressing the Boy Scouts' interest, the
dissent held that courts should question the sincerity of the organization claiming the right to expressive association by refusing to give
such any deference. 8 6 Rather than trust the assertions made by an
organization, courts should make an independent determination as to
whether the private group's expressive purpose was connected to its
exclusionary policy; and its own determination as to whether the unwanted person would significantly affect the group's ability to disseminate its message.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 2450-51.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2455.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2474-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2471.
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Applying the Roberts balancing test, the dissent opined that Dale's
mere presence would not force the Boy Scouts to send a message to the
world, or to scouts, that it embraced homosexuality as a legitimate
form of behavior.8 7 According to the dissent, the Boy Scouts' expressive purpose was to teach general values such as courage, reverence,
and obedience to parents. Since the Boy Scouts was not created specifically to teach scouts that homosexuality was immoral, the dissent
was unconvinced that the Boy Scouts' expressive purpose would be
significantly impeded by Dale's presence.8 8 The dissent held that
even if Dale's presence would send a contrary message, it would be so
in
incidental that the Roberts balancing scale would still be tipped
89
favor of New Jersey's interest in eradicating discrimination.
IV. ANALYSIS
Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale illustrates that the proper standard
to be applied in cases dealing with a private organization's claim to
expressive association as a defense to a state's public accommodations
law is yet unresolved. 9 0 This section of the Note will first argue that
the majority's application of Hurley provides far too much protection
to organizations engaged in activities not independently protected by
the First Amendment. The section will then argue that the dissent's
heightened standard provides far too little protection to groups engaged in purely expressive association. This section of the Note will
conclude by recommending a standard that reconciles these seemingly
competing standards.
A.

The Majority's Standard is Over-protective

The majority in Dale implicitly established that an organization
engaged in some expressive activity is entitled to absolute protection
from state public accommodation laws if it can simply show that the
forced inclusion of the unwanted member would significantly affect its
87. See id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Some commentators have argued that even after the Supreme Court established
the Roberts balancing test, the manner in which state antidiscrimination laws
may impinge on associational practices still remains a mystery. See William P.
Marshall, Discriminationand the Right ofAssociation, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 68, 6869 (1986)(discussing how Roberts was the only case where the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the conflict between a private organization and a state's antidiscrimination law; and yet Roberts did not establish a per se rule for dealing
with this conflict); Devins, supra note 8, at 910 (discussing how the Roberts ad
hoc balancing test is vulnerable to subjectivity). This Note argues that that even
after the Supreme Court decided Dale, the proper weight courts should assign
private organizations and to states under the Roberts balancing test is still
unclear.
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ability to disseminate its message, despite any compelling state interest. The majority facially analyzed Dale under a freedom of expressive association analysis. A close look at its opinion, however, reveals
that it diverged from Roberts by failing to weigh New Jersey's interest,
as well as by giving unqualified judicial deference to the Boy Scouts'
claims regarding how the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly
affect its message.
After initially finding that the Boy Scouts was engaged in expressive activity since it was formed for "instill[ing] values in young people," 9 1 the majority then applied the Roberts balancing test. It first
weighed the Boy Scouts' interest in communicating its preferred message. The majority held that the Boy Scouts had the burden of showing how the forced inclusion of Dale, as a homosexual, would
significantly impede its ability to disseminate its message. 92 The majority was persuaded by the Boy Scouts' assertion that Dale's mere
presence would seriously impede its message of instilling values in
youth because, according to the Boy Scouts, homosexuality is immoral.
The majority held that "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and to the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."93
Despite the majority's analysis of the Boy Scouts' interest in communicating its message, however, the majority ended its expressive
association analysis without considering New Jersey's interest in
eradicating discrimination, as required under Roberts. Instead, the
majority applied the freedom of speech standard espoused by the
Court in Hurley v. Irish-AmericanGay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston.9 4 In Hurley, the Court held that a private organization need
only show how the forced inclusion of the unwanted member significantly affects its ability to communicate its message; the state's inter95
est did not play a role in the Court's analysis.
In addition, the majority also failed to specify what types of organizations are entitled to "judicial deference." Citing DemocraticParty of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,96 the majority held that
courts must give deference to expressive organizations' claims with respect to how its exclusionary policy is connected to its expressive purpose, as well as deference as to the group's view of how the unwanted
member would impede its ability to disseminate its preferred mes91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
See id. 2454-55.
Id. at 2454.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
See id.; supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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sage. 97 Providing deference to a group engaged in merely some expressive activity essentially eliminates that group's burden under
Roberts.
For example, take an organization created for the purpose of conducting seminars in order to educate people about overcoming poverty. To raise money, this organization sells manufactured goods door
to door, and is very profitable. This same organization has a policy
that denies membership to blacks. Under the majority's requirement,
courts would have to give this organization deference even if the organization claimed it denies membership to blacks in order to communicate its preferred message that whites are superior. In addition,
under this standard courts must also give deference to this organization's view as to how the black member would significantly affect its
ability to disseminate its message that whites are superior. Indeed,
the majority's deference would not conduct an independent inquiry
into the sincerity of the organization's assertions. Thus, the majority's
standard would essentially give any organization engaged in some expressive activity maximum First Amendment protection.
The majority's position is mistaken, however, since not every type
of organization is entitled to this much First Amendment protection.
While the Supreme Court in Roberts implied that certain expressive
associations are entitled to discriminate despite any compelling state
interest,9 8 it has also recognized that other expressive associations are
entitled to no such protection. 99 Expressive association is the right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in activities independently protected by the First Amendment.oo Thus, if an organization is engaged in merely some expressive activity, it may not be entitled to as
much protection as an organization engaged in completely, or substantially complete, expressive activity. The majority's unqualified defer97. See id. at 124-26.
98. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). There is also
authority supporting the proposition that a private group is entitled to discriminate, despite a compelling state interest, if the forced inclusion of the unwanted
member significantly impedes the group's message. See Invisible Empire of the
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md.
1988)(holding that the KKKwas allowed to discriminate against a black since the
forced inclusion of a black person as a member would significantly affect its ability to disseminate its message that the white race was, in its view, superior); see
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment,and Sex, 1996
U. CH. LEGAL F. 377, 390-97 (discussing that Hurley strongly suggests that it's
quite possible that in some situations antidiscrimination laws might indeed violate First Amendment expressive association rights).
99. See supra notes 12-60 and accompanying text for examples of expressive organizations that were denied protection under the First Amendment.
100. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.41, at 1065 (4th ed. 1991).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:794

ence to private organizations that engage in merely some expressive
activity provides far too much protection to private organizations that
discriminate in contravention of a state's antidiscrimination laws.
B.

The Dissent's Heightened Standard is Under-protective

'The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion on two grounds.
First, the dissent claimed Hurley was inapplicable since it addressed
the right to freedom of speech and not the right to expressive association. 1 0 ' According to the dissent, the right to freedom of speech is a
much lighter burden since under this standard groups must merely
show how the inclusion of an unwanted member would significantly
impede its message. To qualify for this standard, an organization
must show that it seeks to disseminate a certain message at a given
time, place, or manner.i 0 2 According to the dissent, the freedom of
speech analysis was inappropriate in Dale since the Boy Scouts was
not claiming the right to communicate a specific message at a particular time or place;1O rather, it was claiming a right to communicate a
certain message over a period of time and in a number of places.
Thus, the dissent held that the appropriate standard to apply was the
Roberts balancing test. To this end it was correct.i 0 4
Next, the dissent sharply disagreed with the majority's claim that
courts should give deference to expressive organizations as to how the
group's exclusionary policy is connected to its expressive purpose, as
well as deference to the group's view as to how the forced inclusion of
the unwanted member would significantly affect its message.' 0 5 The
dissent claimed that if courts gave this deference, organizations could
arbitrarily discriminate against a member for any reason. Thus, in
determining how the unwanted person would affect the organization's
message under the Roberts test, courts should question the sincerity of
the organization by conducting an independent analysis that looks be101. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2476 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. But see infra notes 109-153 and accompanying text (noting that although the dissent facially applied the proper standard, it nonetheless departed from that standard by placing heightened requirements on private organizations).
105. The dissent stated:
[Tihe majority insists that we must "give deference to an association's
assertions regarding the nature of its expression" and "we must also give
deference to an association's view of what would impair its expression."
So long as the record "contains written evidence" to support a group's
bare assertion, "[wie need not inquire further." Once the organization
"asserts" that it engages in particular expression "[w]e cannot doubt" the
truth of that assertion.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting the majority in
part)(quotations original)(interal citations omitted).
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yond the mere assertions made by the organization claiming the right
10 6
to expressive association.
In its zeal to check the sincerity of an organization's sincerity, the
dissent opined that a group must not only demonstrate that it is engaged in expressive activity, but must also 1) have a narrowly defined
and unequivocal expressive purpose i o 7 and, 2) have a publicly expressed exclusionary policy.i 0 8 A brief analysis of these heightened
requirements illustrates that the dissent's standard makes it virtually
impossible for groups formed for general expressive purposes, such as
the Boy Scouts, to be protected from state antidiscrimination laws
under the First Amendment's right to expressive association.
Heightened Requirements as an Increased Burden on
Private Organizations
a.

The Requirement that a Group Have a Narrowly Defined and
Unequivocal Expressive Purpose

The dissent's first heightened requirement is that the group claiming the right to expressive association must have a narrowly defined
and unequivocal expressive purpose.i0 9 But the Supreme Court has
specifically held that "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not
a condition of constitutional protection," such that "a private [organization] does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by... failing
to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech."1 0 The dissent's heightened requirement
that a group narrowly define its expressive purpose is wholly unsupported by case law.
But even if this was a requirement, the manner in which the dissent applied it to the Boy Scouts makes it impossible to implement for
any group, such as the Boy Scouts, formed for general expressive purposes. At one point, the dissent suggests that because the Boy Scouts
had a general expressive purpose to instill values in youth and did not
associate for the purpose of teaching youth scouts that homosexuality
106. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. The dissent claimed that a group must have a clear and unequivocal expressive
purpose; however, its analysis plainly established that in order for an organization to have a "clear" expressive purpose it must show its expressive purpose was
narrowly defined. It held, "there is no evidence that this view was part of any
collective effort to foster beliefs about homosexuality." Id. at 2465.
108. See id. at 2463.
109. "To prevail in asserting a right of expressive association as a defense to a charge
of violating an antidiscrimination law, the organization must at least show it has
adopted and advocated an unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom the organization seeks to exclude." Id. at
2471.
110. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995).
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was immoral, its expressive purpose would not be significantly impeded by Dale's presence since it could still teach youth values such as
courage, obedience to parents, et cetera."' This concept implicitly asserts that an expressive association cannot have a general expressive
purpose, such as the Boy Scouts' purpose to instill values in youth.
Under the dissent's theory, the Boy Scouts would likely be required to
narrow its expressive purpose by explicitly stating a list of "don'ts" in
its Boy Scouts Handbook that fall outside its conception of morality.1 ' 2 This might look something like this:
'SCOUT OATH:
On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and my country and to
obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight*...
SCOUT LAW:
A Scout is Trustworthy, Obedient,.. Courteous, Clean,**...
** The following conduct is immoral and unclean behavior: Nude lap dancing;
going to topless bars (even when the dancers are wearing pasties on their nipples); playing strip poker; acts of bestiality or incest; fondling one's penis; looking at girls' breasts and thinking dirty thoughts; viewing Playboy, Penthouse
or Hustler Magazines; watching NC-17 movies that display penises, vaginas
or a woman's breasts; bathing nude in the open; or surfing naked."

As one can see, it would be absurd to publish such a list in a handbook
distributed to boys ranging between the ages of twelve to eighteen
years if the boy is a Boy Scout, or age eight to eleven if the boy is a Cub
Scout. And yet, under the dissent's heightened standard, this requirement is implied.
Further, part of the freedom of speech includes the freedom not to
speak.ii 3 The Boy Scouts specifically addressed this in its Brief when
it stated that "[t]he Boy Scouts explains that the Scout Oath and Law
provide 'a positive moral code for living; they are a list of 'do's' rather
than 'don'ts."'i 4 As will be discussed in more detail below, requiring
the Boy Scouts to specifically list numerous acts it considers immoral
5
would clearly violate its right to freedom of speech."i
In addition, a private group formed for general purposes such as
the Boy Scouts cannot meet the dissent's requirement by specifically
listing the types of conduct it is opposed to since such lists are no
111. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2460-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. "It is plain as the light of day that neither one of these principles - "morally
straight" and "clean" - says the slightest thing about homosexuality. Indeed,
neither term in the Boy Scouts' Law and Oath expresses any position whatsoever
on sexual matters." Id. at 2461.
113. "Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave
unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one
who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say.'" Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573
(quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1,
11 (1986)(plurality opinion)(emphasis in original)).
114. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452 (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 3).
115. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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where near exhaustive. If the Boy Scouts discovered that a leader acting in a manner not explicitly prohibited in the list of "don'ts," the Boy
Scouts would remain powerless to terminate his membership. For example, take the hypothetical list of prohibited activity listed above. If
the Boy Scouts later learned that one of its leaders was a pimp, it
could not revoke his membership since it failed to include the word
"pimp" in its list of immoral behavior. Clearly, not every type of prohibited activity can be listed. Therefore, the dissent's claim that an
organization's expressive purpose must be clearly and narrowly articulated is impossible to meet for organizations that are created for
general expressive purposes such as the Boy Scouts.
The dissent also claimed that an organization must have an unequivocal expressive purpose. But the majority rejected this requirement by citing Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division,116 where the Court held that an organization's "beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection."'117 Although
the Thomas Court addressed a religious organization, its rationale is
nonetheless applicable to organizations engaged in purely expressive
activity, as will be discussed in more detail below.llS
Even if this requirement was valid, the manner in which the dissent applied it in Dale clearly illustrates how the Roberts ad hoc balancing test can be manipulated to get a desired outcome. This is
evidenced by the dissent's reasons why it believed the Boy Scouts' policy regarding homosexuality was equivocal. But each of these reasons
is wholly unsupported by the record.
First, the dissent claimed that while the Boy Scouts' "1991 and
1992 policies state one interpretation of 'morally straight' and 'clean,'
the group's published definitions appearing in the Boy Scout and
Scoutmaster Handbooks take quite another view."119 But the Scout
116. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).

117. Id. at 714.
118. See infra notes 156-162 (discussing how certain groups should be entitled to judicial deference with respect to its claim as to how its message would be impeded by
the forced inclusion of the unwanted member). This Note argues that just as
religious groups' expressive purpose need not be logical or internally consistent,
neither should an organization that is engaged in purely expressive activity such
as the Boy Scouts.
119. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Boy Scout Handbook defines "morally straight" in the following manner: "[tlo be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice.... Be clean in your
speech and actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs. The values you follow as
a Scout will help you become virtuous and self-reliant." Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1203 (N.J. 1999)(quoting Boy SCOUT HANDBOOK 551
(10th ed. 1990)).
The Boy Scout Handbook defines "clean" in the following manner:
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Oath,12o Law,121 and Boy Scout Mission Statement12 2 are completely
A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean.... You never need to be
ashamed of dirt that will wash off... [But] [t]here's another kind of dirt
that won't come off by washing. It is the kind that shows up in foul
language and harmful thoughts. Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that ridicule other people and hurt their feelings. The
same is true of racial slurs and jokes making fun of ethnic groups or
people with physical or mental limitations ....
[A scout] defends those
who are targets of insults.
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1203 (quoting Boy ScouT HANDBOOK, supra, at 561).
120. The Scout Oath states: "On my honor I will do my best [t]o do my duty to God and
my country and to obey the Scout Law; [t]o help other people at all times; [tlo
keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." Dale, 734
A.2d at 1202.
121. The Scout Law states:
A Scout is TRUSTWORTHY. A Scout tells the truth. He keeps his
promises. Honesty is a part of his code of conduct. People can always
depend on him.
A Scout is LOYAL. A Scout is true to his family, friends, Scout leaders,
school, nation, and world community.
A Scout is HELPFUL. A Scout is concerned about other people. He
willingly volunteers to help others without expecting payment or
reward.
A Scout is FRIENDLY. A Scout is a friend to all. He is a brother to
other Scouts. He seeks to understand others. He respects those with
ideas and customs that are different from his own.
A Scout is COURTEOUS. A Scout is polite to everyone regardless of
age or position. He knows that good manners make it easier for people to
get along together.
A Scout is KIND. A Scout understands there is strength in being gentle. He treats others as he wants to be treated. He does not harm or kill
anything without reason.
A Scout is OBEDIENT. A Scout follows the rules of his family, school,
and troop. He obeys the laws of his community and country. If he thinks
these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed in an
orderly manner rather than disobey them.
A Scout is CHEERFUL. A Scout looks for the bright side of life. He
cheerfully does tasks that come his way. He tries to make others happy.
A Scout is THRIFTY. A Scout works to pay his way and to help others.
He saves for the future. He protects and conserves natural resources. He
carefully uses time and property.
A Scout is BRAVE. A Scout can face danger even if he is afraid. He has
the courage to stand for what he thinks is right even if others laugh at
him or threaten him.
A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean. He
goes around with those who believe in living by these same ideals. He
helps keep his home and community clean.
A Scout is REVERENT. A Scout is reverent toward God. He is faithful
in his religious duties. He respects the beliefs of others.
Id.
122. The Boy Scouts Mission Statement states:
It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping
to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to
make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential.
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consistent with the Boy Scouts' exclusionary policy. 12 3 The Scout

Handbook and ScoutmasterHandbook both define morality in positive

terms, rather than negative terms. 1 24 Even if the Boy Scouts' policy

was silent with respect to homosexuals, which the record fails to support,125 excluding homosexuals is not inconsistent with the Boy
Scouts' assertion that homosexuality is not morally straight. In addition, as discussed above, silence is still protected under free speech
analysis.
Next, since the Boy Scouts has a broad religious tolerance, the dissent claimed its expressive purpose and exclusionary policy are inconsistent since some religions do not view homosexuality as immoral.126
But this argument completely misses the point since the exclusionary
policy precludes homosexuals that seek to be adult leaders, not homosexual youth scouts.12 7 The distinction is an important one. Under

the Boy Scouts' claim, a scout leader should be a positive role model to
youth scouts. Assuming that the Boy Scouts thinks homosexuality is
immoral, its view that a homosexual leader would send a mixed message that homosexuality was an appropriate form of behavior is quite
consistent with its exclusionary policy. Although youth scouts may influence fellow scouts, they are not required to be role models. Thus,
for the purposes of Dale, it is not consistent for the Boy Scouts to have
a policy against homosexuality, while at the same time having a broad
religious tolerance.
The dissent could have argued, but did not, that since a youth
scout leader could be a role model for his peers, instructing a youth
scout to follow his religion would be contradictory. This argument
might undermine the Scouts position since the Boy Scouts' recommendation for youth to follow their religions is most likely geared at guiding these youth to attain a certain moral ideal. But this scenario only
poses a problem for the Boy Scouts if a court further accepts the assumption that many religions advocate, not merely tolerate, homosex123. A 1978 position statement to the Boy Scouts' Executive Committee, signed by
Downing B. Jenks, the President of the Boy Scouts, and Harvey L. Price, the
Chief Scout Executive, expresses the Boy Scouts' "official position" with regard to
"homosexuality and Scouting":
Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual be
a volunteer Scout leader?
A. No. The Boy Scouts of America is a private, membership organization
and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right. We do not believe
that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate. We will
continue to select only those who in our judgment meet our standards
and qualifications for leadership.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
124. See id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2453.
126. See id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 2453.
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uality. But it is unlikely that many religions, if any, take this
position. It is more likely that while some religions accept homosexuals and may even allow a homosexual to participate in meetings or
hold positions of responsibility, most religions do not advocate homosexuality as a moral ideal. Thus, even if Dale dealt with excluding
youth scout leaders, which it does not, it is illogical to claim the Boy
Scouts' policy with regards to homosexuals is equivocal on the basis it
encourages its youth scouts to follow their religion.
Third, the dissent noted that the Boy Scouts' policy against homosexuals was inconsistent with its goal to strive for a "representative
membership."' 28 Since the Boy Scouts defines representative membership as "boy membership [that] reflects proportionality the characteristics of the boy population of its service area,"' 2 9 the dissent
implied that the Boy Scouts' policy should include homosexuals because some of the boy population is most likely homosexual. A common sense interpretation of this policy, however, is that the Boy
Scouts seek a representative membership with regards to economic,
cultural, ethnic, and religious background. Implying that the Boy
Scouts representative membership policy should embrace homosexual
boys since some of the population of young boys between the ages of
12-17 may be homosexual is very problematic. Under this interpretation, the Boy Scouts would also be required to include young members
who look at pornography, have unprotected premarital sex, or other
acts the Boy Scouts may consider "immoral," since some young men
between the ages twelve and seventeen may engage in these activities.
This interpretation of "representative membership" would effectively
preclude the Boy Scouts from revoking the membership of boys engaged in these types of activities, an absurd conclusion. But more importantly, as mentioned above, the Boy Scouts' exclusionary policy
prohibits homosexuals from becoming adult leaders; it makes no reference whatsoever to excluding a youth homosexual. Thus, this argument is completely irrelevant.
Finally, the dissent claimed that the Boy Scouts' 1978 policy on
homosexuality was facially equivocal, since it both prohibited homosexuals from being adult members, while simultaneously requiring its
128. The dissent stated:
BSA describes itself as having a "representative membership," which it
defines as "boy membership [that] reflects proportionately the characteristics of the boy population of its service area." In particular, the group
emphasizes that "[n]either the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts
of America permits the exclusion of any boy .... To meet these responsibilities we have made a commitment that our membership shall be representative of all the population in every community, district, and
council.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2460 (citations omitted)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
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executives to admit homosexuals as leaders if the law so required.30
The policy states that the Boy Scouts deny professional or nonprofessional leadership positions to homosexuals unless the law prohibits
such.131 This statement explicitly states that it is opposed to homosexuals as leaders. The exception is that if the law prohibits discrimination in such a manner, the Boy Scouts should first abide by the law
and then seek to change it.132 The inconsistency is anything but apparent. Holding the Boy Scouts' policy facially equivocal essentially
penalizes it for adhering to the philosophy: "it is better to be safe [obey
the law and then peacefully try to change it], than sorry."
b.

The Requirement that the Exclusionary Policy be Publicly
Expressed.

The dissent also required that an organization show it made its
exclusionary policy publicly expressed.13 3 Ironically, this requirement
forces an organization to speak out on matters it is against in order to
preserve the right to expressive association. But placing this requirement on the Boy Scouts clearly violates its First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. The Supreme Court has held that implicit in the
notion of having a freedom to speak is a group's right to choose not to
speak.134 Compelling a group to speak about conduct it is fundamentally opposed to violates this right in its most obvious form.13 5 The
Boy Scouts have explicitly expressed that it refrains from discussing
sexual matters with its scouts.'

36

But even if a private organization was required to publicize its exclusionary policy, the public was on sufficient notice of the Boy Scouts'
130. See id. at 2463-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. "[The [Boy Scouts'] 1978 policy [on homosexuality] was never publicly expressed.... It was an internal memorandum, never circulated beyond the few
members of BSA's Executive Committee. It remained, in effect, a secret Boy
Scouts policy." Id.
134. See Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 796-97 (1988).
135. See People v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350 (9 Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1216
(1996)("[t]he First Amendment protects persons from being compelled to express
'adherence to an ideological point of view they find unacceptable'")(citing Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977)); see also 16A A~i. JuR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 463 (1998).
136. The Boy Scout Handbook states:
You may have boys asking you for information or advice about sexual
matters.... How should you handle such matters?

Rule number 1: You do not undertake to instruct Scouts, in any formalized manner, in the subject of sex and family life. The reasons are that it
is not construed to be Scouting's proper area ....
Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:794

stance on homosexuality.1 3 7 While every United States citizen probably was not aware of these lawsuits, they were nonetheless public information. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[t]he fact that the
organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops ... does
not mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection."1SS
In sum, the dissent added heightened requirements to the traditional Roberts balancing test, resulting in an increased burden on private organizations. Even if these were required, the record clearly
shows the Boy Scouts met each requirement. The dissent's application of the Roberts ad hoc balancing test further evidences the ease in
manipulating that standard to achieve a desired outcome.
Back to the Traditional Roberts Test
After applying its heightened requirements, the dissent then returned to the traditional Roberts test, determining whether the Boy
Scouts had proved that the forced inclusion of Dale as a scout leader
would significantly affect its ability to disseminate its message. The
dissent held that Dale would not send any message that homosexuality was a legitimate form of behavior.139 Since there was no evidence
that Dale had ever discussed his homosexuality with anyone in the
Boy Scouts prior to that time, the dissent opined that he would not
advocate that position in the future.140 But this argument is fundamentally flawed for several reasons.
First, it fails to recognize that Dale's mere presence would send a
message that homosexuality was a moral form of conduct. Dale himself had, just prior to sending in his application for a renewed membership, made a conscious decision to "come out of the closet" and join
a pro-gay activist organization at the college he attended.141 Thus,
Dale's mere presence would be sending a message; more importantly,
his mere presence would pose a significant threat to the Boy Scouts'
ability to limit its verbal speech to non-sexual matters.
137. See id. at 2453 (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America, C-365529 (Cal. Super. Ct. July, 25 1991); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
138. Id. at 2455.
139. The dissent claimed:
Dale's inclusion in the Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in Hurley. His
participation sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.
Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute
any fact sheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message. If there
is any kind of message being sent, then, it is by the mere act of joining
the Boy Scouts. Such an act does not constitute an instance of symbolic
speech under the First Amendment.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 2476-77.
141. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. 1999).
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Next, the dissent's argument fails to view a scout leader's mere
presence as communicating a message to scouts. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that symbolic action is protected speech. But the
dissent held that an individual must intend to communicate a certain
message to be entitled to this symbolic speech.i 42 Since the Boy Scout
leaders did not intend to communicate a message by setting an example to youth scouts, the dissent held the Boy Scouts should not be entitled to the right to symbolic speech. This is erroneous, however,
because the Boy Scouts' 1991 official statement states that its scout
leaders are to be a good role model for scouts, 1 4 3 which further supports the Boy Scouts' claim that a scout leader's example is intended
to communicate a message. In addition, the Boy Scout Handbook instructs its leaders that they are to teach by word and deed.144
Finally, the dissent's argument fails to recognize that Dale's mere
presence would force the Boy Scouts to send a message that homosexuality is an appropriate form of behavior. The dissent argued that because many scoutmasters have political views the Boy Scouts may not
support, and because certain leaders share these viewpoints with
others, it is unreasonable for one to believe that that the Boy Scouts
also shares these views. But this argument is only logical if the Boy
Scouts was formed specifically for advancing a certain political ideology. Because the Boy Scouts' entire purpose is to instill values in
youth, a homosexual leader permitted to remain in the ranks would
unquestionably send a message that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexuality as a proper form of moral behavior.
Not only did the dissent create a heightened standard for private
organizations, it also alleviated the state's burden in the Roberts balancing test. Organizations subject to this test face the daunting task
of overcoming the state's "compelling" interest. 4 5 This can be daunting because it is almost inherently compelling to eradicate destructive
discrimination from society. And yet this is precisely how the dissent
in Dale framed New Jersey's compelling interest. It stated, "New
Jersey prides itself on judging each individual by his or her merits and
on being 'in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from our society.'"' 46 This begs the
question, however, by presupposing that the Boy Scouts' act of defining its membership is indeed unlawful or even harmful to society. But
as discussed above, not all discrimination is harmful to society as a
whole, or evil and unnecessary. Indeed, the First Amendment permits
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2453.
See THE ScoUTMASTER HAmNBooK 57 (1972).
See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ.
Bd. Of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (1978)).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:794

and even encourages some forms of discrimination on the grounds
that an individual's voice may not be heard unless it forms a group
with those who share the same core values and/or ideologies.14 7 Thus,
certain types of discrimination are lawful and beneficial to society and
to individuals.
In support of its proposition that New Jersey had a compelling interest in specifically eradicating discrimination against homosexuals,
the dissent cited Roberts v. United States Jaycees,i48 Runyon v. McCrary,i49 Hishon v. King & Spalding,1 5 o and Railway Mail Association v. Corsi.15i In each of these cases the state had a compelling
interest in enacting public accommodation laws to "eliminate discrimination."1 52 But the dissent's use of these cases is misguided because
each dealt with either race or gender discrimination, which are clearly
suspect classes. By framing New Jersey's compelling interest as eradicating discrimination, the dissent virtually would be creating an umbrella of protection for classes that have traditionally been denied
constitutional protection. While women and racial minorities have
been identified as suspect classes, the Supreme Court has never classified homosexuality in this category.i 5 3 Under the dissent's standard, a Christian organization that denied membership to an
individual wearing a shirt bearing a picture of the "Piss-Christ" would
lose, since the state would have a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination on the basis of appearance as indicated in its state's
antidiscrimination law. While appearance has never been a suspect,
or even protected, class triggering the compelling interest analysis,
the manner in which the dissent framed New Jersey's interest would
essentially provide traditionally unprotected groups with the highest
protection.
In sum, the dissent's heightened standard creates an increased
burden on private organizations under the guise of the Roberts balancing test, while alleviating the state's burden to show a compelling interest. Although its concern regarding the wide-sweeping protection
created by the majority's standard was well justified, the dissent's
standard is nonetheless a swing in the wrong direction. It essentially
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
See id.
427 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1976).
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2467 n. 10-12 (2000)(Stevens,

J., dissenting).
153. See Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii'sRecognition of Same-Sex Marriages,53 MD.L. REv. 450,
475-76 (1994)(noting that very few courts have analyzed sexual orientation as a
suspect class).
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precludes many private organizations that were formed for general expressive purposes from securing the right to expressive association.
C.

A Proposed Standard

This section of the Note proposes a standard that reconciles the
seemingly opposing standards set out by the majority and the dissent
in Dale. Specifically, this section argues that courts should first identify the quality of organization claiming the right to expressive association by looking at the group's purpose, as well as its predominant
activities. Then, depending on these two factors, courts should apply
one of four levels of scrutiny to determine when an organization's
claim to expressive association should prevail over a state's interest in
eliminating discrimination, or vice-versa.
In her concurring opinion in Roberts, Justice O'Connor insightfully
noted that the Court should first determine whether the organization
was significantly dedicated to First Amendment activity or whether it
was primarily a commercial organization that only incidentally exercised first amendment rights.154 This requirement is logical considering the right to expressive association is conditioned on whether the
group is engaging in activities independently protected by the First
Amendment. Justice O'Connor pointed out, however, that "[many associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive or purely
commercial."'155 Indeed, many associations will fall somewhere in between this two positions. While Justice O'Connor did not suggest a
sliding scale of protection for groups that may engage in limited,
quasi, or purely expressional association, her insight was important
nonetheless.
In determining whether an organization should be entitled to maximum First Amendment protection, the first step courts should take is
to identify the purpose and predominant activity of the organization.
This step should be done prior to applying the Roberts balancing test
because, as will be seen below, depending on the type of expressive
activity an organization is engaged in will determine whether that
group will be immune from a state's interest in eradicating discrimination. In addition, under the proposed standard, only organizations
dedicated to First Amendment activity should be given judicial
deference.
154. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (MThe Court entirely neglects to establish at the threshold that the
Jaycees is an association whose activities or purposes should engage the strong
protections that the First Amendment extends to expressive associations.").
155. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Purely Expressive Associations Deserve the Highest
Constitutional Protection
Purely expressive associations should be afforded the highest constitutional protection. 156 These groups are those formed for, and engaged predominately in, constitutionally protected speech or
conduct.' 5 7 Purely expressive associations should be exempt from the
Roberts balancing test if they can show that the unwanted member
significantly affects its ability to disseminate its message. Protection
of the message itself should be judged by the same standards as protection of speech by an individual.158 Under this standard, no state
interest can be compelling enough, or narrowly tailored enough, if it
prevents a purely expressive organization from selecting its membership for the purpose of defining its voice. In addition, only by providing this increased protection will groups formed for general purposes,
such as the Boy Scouts, be safe from a judicially active court that
seeks to impose its own agenda on the organization. Not only is this
high level of protection logical considering that the organization is engaged predominantly in First Amendment activity, it is also in harmony with case law.'59
Although this standard and the majority's standard in Dale do
share some element of absolutism, they are nonetheless quite distinguishable in scope. As discussed above, the majority's opinion stated
that courts must give deference to an organization as to its assertion
of how its exclusionary policy is connected to its expressive purpose.
In addition, courts must give deference with respect to the group's
view on how the forced inclusion of the unwanted member would affect its message. 16 0 By giving this deference without qualification,
and without any discussion of the state's compelling interest, the majority's standard implicitly grants organizations engaged predominately in non-expressive activity the right to discriminate. By
contrast, this proposed standard requires courts to qualify the group
claiming the right to discriminate. If the court finds the group is a
purely expressive association, courts would then be required to give
156. See NowAK & RoTruNDA, supra note 100, at 1065.
157. See id.
158. "Protection of the association's right to define its membership derives from the
recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a
voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice." Roberts, 468
U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)("government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views.").
159. Since Roberts was the only case squarely addressing the conflict between a private club and a state's antidiscrimination law prior to Dale, this proposed standard would still be in harmony with Roberts. See supra note 90.
160. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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deference to the organization's claims as to what will affect its ability
to disseminate its message. In other words, rather than give complete
deference to any organization engaged in some expressive activity,
this proposed standard requires courts to determine the quality and
quantity of expressive activity for which the organization is engaged.
Only when this is determined will the court know whether the group
is entitled to the highest form of First Amendment protection, or the
right to select its membership as well as its message.
One example of a group meeting the above criteria is the Boy
Scouts of America. Not only was it formed for the purpose of instilling
values in young men, its predominant activity is teaching principles of
morality, physical fitness, and outdoor survival. This teaching is carried out explicitly through verbal instruction, and is carried out implicitly through the scout leaders' examples. Although the Boy Scouts
collect dues, sell uniforms and related scouting items, such commercial activity is to further the organization's expressive activities. And
while the Boy Scouts do have a relatively non-selective membership
policy with respect to youth members, its policy with respect to adult
leaders is much more selective. 16 1 Thus, it is evident the Boy Scouts
tailor its adult membership in order to define the voice that will communicate its message to instill values in youth. As such, the majorshould not be subject to the
ity's conclusion that the Boy Scouts
62
Roberts balancing test was proper.'
Quasi-Expressive Associations Deserve Intermediate
Constitutional Protection
Courts should afford intermediate protection to groups formed for
expressive purposes that are engaged in "quasi-expressive" association, or a mixture of commercial/expressive activity. Under the proposed standard, once the private group met this threshold criteria, the
state would have the burden of showing it has a compelling interest
and that its anti-discrimination law is the least restrictive means to
achieving that interest. On the other side of the Roberts scale, the
group must prove that the forced inclusion of the unwanted member
would significantly impede its ability to express its message. The outcome would be determined by how narrowly the state's interest was
defined, how clearly the private organization's expressive purpose was
articulated, and how well the expressive purpose was connected to the
exclusionary policy.
161. See supra note 123.
162. Although the majority's implicit conclusion that the Boy Scouts was not subject to
New Jersey's compelling interest was correct, this Note contends it erred by not
qualifying which groups were so entitled. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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This standard is distinguishable from the standard applied to
purely expressive associations in two distinct ways. First, this standard incorporates the Roberts balancing test, whereas the standard
for purely expressive associations would not. Second, the quasi-expressive organization would not be entitled to judicial deference.
Rather, the courts would conduct an independent investigation by
looking into all the evidence from the individual claiming discrimination as well as the private group, and then use its own judgment as to
whether the group's exclusionary policy is connected to its expressive
purpose, as well as how the forced inclusion of the unwanted member
would affect the organization's ability to disseminate its message.
Thus, although an organization engaged in substantial commercial activity could overcome a state's interest in eradicating discrimination,
such would be the exception rather than the general rule. As such,
most private organizations would be subject to its state anti-discrimination laws that fit into this category.
One example of a group qualifying for this intermediate protection
is the United States Jaycees. In Roberts, the Court agreed that the
Jaycees was created for the purpose of pursuing educational and charitable purposes to foster the growth and development of young men's
civic organizations in the United States. As discussed above,1 63 however, much of its activity was commercial in nature. Although Minnesota had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against
women, the Jaycees could not show how the integration of a woman as
a full status member would significantly affect its ability to communicate its message. In that case, the Jaycees were not only subject to the
balancing test, but the Court refused to give it deference with respect
to how a woman with the status of a full member would significantly
affect its message.
An even lesser form of protection should be afforded to quasi-expressive groups formed for commercial purposes, yet engaging in a
mixture of non-expressive and expressive activities. This type of group
would have the initial burden of showing that it is engaged in substantially expressive activities. The individual claiming discrimination
would then have to prove that the state's interest in enacting the law
was an important one, and that the law is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. As with the quasi-expressive association discussed immediately above, under this regime courts should not give deference to
an organization as to its view of how the forced inclusion of the unwanted member would significantly affect its ability to disseminate its
message. So long as the state's law against discrimination was narrowly tailored to serve its purpose, the private organization would not
likely be entitled to discriminate in its membership policies, since
163. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
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most laws against discrimination serve important governmental
interests.
Non-Expressive, Commercial Associations Deserve the Least
Constitutional Protection
Courts should afford the least degree of protection to an association
formed for, and engaged predominately in, non-expressive commercial
activity.16 4 Under this scheme, the state must prove that its law is
only rationally related to its purpose; if it was, the state could compel
the group to integrate the unwanted member. Under this standard,
then, commercial organizations would receive virtually no
16 5
protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

States are playing an active role in eliminating discrimination
from both public as well as private organizations. Laws against discrimination are becoming increasingly broad, protecting an ever-expanding base of classes. As benevolent as a state's interest may be in
eradicating discrimination, however, not all classes are entitled to the
highest degree of First Amendment protection. In addition, certain
types of discrimination are not only constitutionally permitted, but
crucial in preserving our identity as Americans.
This Note proposes a logical compromise to two competing standards of expressive association: the Roberts ad hoc balancing test and
the freedom of speech standard espoused by the majority in Dale. The
proposed standard not only protects purely expressive organizations
from judicial activism and overly broad state laws, it also provides
states with maximum power in eradicating the harmful effects of unconstitutional discrimination. If the Supreme Court adopted this
standard, the tension caused by the dichotomy between equality and
freedom will be significantly reduced, and lower courts will be bound
to follow a more objective, consistent standard.
Even if this Note's proposed standard is not implemented, Dale is
still a victory. It is not only a victory for private organizations that
seek unfettered expression, but also a victory for every minority group
164. 'rhe Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers,
suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions,
without restrain from the State. A shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal
only with persons of one sex." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. Commercial associations may, of course, be entitled to freedom of speech rights if
such can show it seeks to disseminate a certain message at certain time or place.
See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657
(1990)(discussing how a corporation's political contributions are entitled to protection as speech, despite the commercial nature of the organization).

824

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:794

claiming oppression, including gays and lesbians. Dale protects every
oppressed individual's right to form a group for the purposes of expressing ideas, no matter how general, without fear that a court will force
it to include an individual that will potentially impede that group's
ability to freely express ideas. Quoting the Supreme Court, one constitutional law professor insightfully stated, "We cannot limit the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment rights without limiting everyone's First
Amendment rights... [flor minority groups that often face discrimination from the majority, this is a constitutional guarantee worth
66
protecting."1

166. Thomas E. Baker, In Wake of Dale;Is Boy Scouts Ruling MajorSetback or Victory
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